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Abstract
In absence of bank risk-taking behavior, opacity is dened as the inability of depos-
itors, speculators and central banker to disentangle default risk and assets return
from the assets value. We show the conditions under which opacity leads to runs on
a solvent bank in equilibrium and uncertainty on fundamental values of the asset.
The main repercussion of opacity is on the central banks policy response which is
ine¢ cient during a banking crisis.
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1 Introduction
The opacity of banks is conventionally perceived as the inability of an agent
to assess the e¤ective riskiness embodied in a banks assets portfolio. The
di¢ culty in quantifying risk arises from either the banks engagement in less-
transparent and non-traditional activities -Myers and Rajan (1995), Morgan
(2002), Wagner (2007)- or from limited accounting disclosures -Cordella and
Yeyati (1998), Estrella (2004)-. Asymmetric information and/or moral haz-
ard are typically the prerequisites for the existence of opacity in the current
literature.
To many observers, opacity has had a key role during the recent banking
crisis. Most prominently, opacity can be related to the uncertainty on the
actual solvency status of banks, which was essentially due to the discretionary
accounting standards used by banks in their assetsvaluation. Specically, fair
value standards 1 were only applied to trading books of banks and to brokerage
rmsholdings valuation. Illiquid assets were, instead, valued at each banks
discretion using internal accounting models. Such internal models have made
very hard for outsiders to value the risk embodied in some of the banksassets.
Furthermore, the uncertainty on the actual solvency of many banks was further
intesied (i.e. increase in opacity) by both the lack of markets and inability
to asses the on fundamental values of the toxicproducts.
The response of US authorities to this concern has not been exactly what
discouraged investors were hoping for. For instance, the Financial Account-
ing Standard Board (FASB) on April the 2nd 2009 decided to relax mark-to-
market valuation rules, giving, thus, more discretion to banks when evaluating
whether a permanent loss has occurred and how to measure it. Moreover, the
announcement of the details of the results of the stress test carried out on
the top 19 US banks has occurred after a long debate on whether the public
disclosure was appropriate.
This institutional behavior is, however, in line with the conclusions drawn by
1 In order to assess their fairsolvency status, banks should have recognized their
marked-to-market losses which imply the unveiling of their opaque balance sheet.
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the existing theoretical models which recommend a certain degree of opac-
ity in particular conditions. Cordella and Yeyati (1998), for instance, argue
that portfolio risk disclosure increases the probability of bank failure when
the bank manager does not have control over the volatility of the assetsre-
turn. In Myers and Rajan (1995) opacity 2 is desirable for the investors as it
leaves limited scope for trading assets and asset substitution undertaken by
managers. Wagner (2007) shows that it is optimal for banking managers to be
less-transparent, especially during periods of increased nancial development.
These existing models, thus, by focusing on the conditions under which opac-
ity is optimal by the bank manager, leave unexplored the e¤ects on opacity
on several interesting issues such as the run/no-run decision of depositors,
asset market pricing and central bankers intervention. Understanding the ex-
istence of opacity a¤ects other agents, other than the banks prot-maximizers
managers, is obviously relevant for policy-makers.
The aim of this work is to account for all these issues in a simple theoretical
model in which opacity has an enhanced role. In particular, we consider opacity
as a per-se phenomenon which is not implied by moral hazard behaviors or
asymmetric information, as found in the existing theoretical models. In this
regard, we re-dene opacity as the inability of depositors, speculators and
central banker to disentangle default risk and assets return from the assets
expected return. We abstract from asymmetric information since the bank
faces the same uncertainty as the other agents when proposing to depositors
a standard deposit contract. The signal on the assets expected return, which
is true and accurate, is determined by the nature and announced by the bank
in an intermediate period, when all the agents have the same information set.
Moreover, we assume that the contract o¤ered to depositors solves the optimal
risk-sharing problem (Allen and Gale (1998)); therefore, the riskiness of the
illiquid asset is irrelevant for the optimal portfolio allocation chosen by the
bank. In this way, we are able to abstract from a situation in which the bank
has incentives to undertake a moral hazard-type of behavior.
Our modied version of the benchmark model of Allen and Gale (1998) implies
the inclusion of default risk of the risky asset. This added feature allows us
2 Opacity in this paper implies less liquid assets.
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to draw interesting implications of opacity for bank-runs and re-sale pricing
when speculators are either risk-neutral or risk-averse. We show that with
opacity a bank run may occur with positive probability in equilibrium even
if the bank turns out to be solvent when uncertainty unveils. Moreover, we
argue that opacity leads to uncertainty on the fundamental value of the risky
asset when speculators in the asset market are risk-averse. Intervention by a
central banker has many interesting features when opacity occurs. Intervention
is desirable since the central banker bears the eventual losses from the risky
asset, ensuring a xed level of consumption to depositors. However, the central
bank lends either more or less than the bank should be entitled to, given the
quality of its assets.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we propose the theoretical
framework of the paper in which we dene the standard deposit contract of-
fered by the bank to consumers and the asset market in which the risky asset
might be traded. Moreover, we specify the information set of the bank, con-
sumers and speculators. Section 3 looks at the risky asset market pricing given
the opaque signal sent by the nature in the interim period. We distinguish be-
tween two cases: one in which speculators are risk-neutral and another in
which they are risk-averse. In section 4 we introduce the central banker and
we analyze the welfare e¤ects for the consumers following an intervention. We
draw di¤erent welfare implication depending on whether the speculators are
risk-neutral or risk-averse. Section 6 concludes.
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2 The Model
2.1 Framework
The model comprises a four-periods economy, t = 0; 1; 3
2
; 2, with one consump-
tion good (withdrawals). The agents in this framework are: one representative
risk-neutral bank, a continuum of rational depositors/consumers and specula-
tors. In section 4 we will introduce the central banker.
2.1.1 Depositors
Depositors are uninsured with initial endowment E normalized to 1, i.e. E = 1.
They will deposit all their endowment in t = 0 at the bank, which o¤ers
them insurance against idiosyncratic liquidity shock 3 . Indeed, at period 0,
depositors do not know when they will be hit by an idiosyncratic liquidity
shock: with probability  a given consumer will be withdrawing C1 at t = 1,
thus, being early consumer, and with probability 1    he will withdraw C2
in t = 2, being a late consumer. Ex-ante, the size of  is publicly known,
however, each consumer does not know which type (early/late) he will be at
t = 1. The continuum of depositors is normalized to one such that  is the
proportion of early consumers. The utility arising from the consumption of
each type in each period is described by a concave and continuous consumers
utility function u(Ct):
2.1.2 The Bank
At t = 0 the risk-neutral bank issues demand deposit liabilities equal to one
unit of consumption, collecting the whole consumersendowment. The bank
operates in a competitive market, maximizing the expected utility of con-
3 The bank invests on behalf of consumers given its expertise in recognizing valuable
risky assets. Deposits allow consumers that are hit in the last date by a liquidity
shock to enjoy the return of the investment made by the bank. Depositors that
are hit by the liquidity shock in the earlier period are assured a given level of
consumption.
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sumers.
At date 0 the bank can invest the deposits in a safe and in a risky asset.
The safe asset, y, is in variable supply and can be considered as a storage
technology. Its price at t = 0 is normalized to one. y can be liquidated at no
cost both at t = 1 and at t = 2 and has a risk-free gross return equal to 1. The
amount of investment in risky asset is denoted as x and is such that x+y = 1.
x is in xed supply and yields a random return R only in t = 2. In t = 2 R
yields Rh with probability p or zero with probability 1  p.
2.1.2.1 Information set of the Bank and Consumers At t = 0 and
t = 1 both the bank and the consumers face the same uncertainty regarding the
random variable R. More specically, they do not know both the probability
density function of R and the exact value that R might take in the good state,
that is, Rh.
Therefore, these agents in t = 0 and t = 1 know that in t = 2 R yields ~Rh
with probability pi or zero with probability 1   pi where i = l; h. If p = pl
then, the asset carries an high default risk; if p = ph then, the default risk is
low. The probability p allows us to model the default risk of the risky asset,
which is equal to 1   pi. p = ph with probability , while p = pl occurs
with probability 1   : ~Rh is also a random variable which is assumed to
be distributed according to a normal distribution with mean Rh and nite
variance Rh. The distribution of Rh is ex-ante common knowledge.
We further assume that E[R] > 1; this implies that investment in risky asset
dominates in terms of expected value the investment in storage technology.
2.1.2.2 The Deposit Contract The bank o¤ers non-state contingent
contracts that allow depositors to withdraw their funds on demand in either
t = 1 or t = 2.
The bank promises a xed level of consumptions C1 = c to early consumers
and C2 > c to late consumers. If it is unfeasible to give at least c to all
consumers then there is risky asset liquidation and pro-rata distribution among
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all depositors. The size of c is computed from a state-contingent optimal risk-
sharing problem where no asset liquidation takes place. Since there is aggregate
uncertainty in both the return and of its probability density function of the
risky asset, the optimal risk sharing problem will yield an optimal portfolio
choice (y; x) which is independent of R; Rh and of the probabilities attached
to it:
The problem can be formalized as follows (see Allen and Gale (1998) for
details):
MaxE[
x;y
U(C1) + (1  )U(C2)] (ORS)
subject to:
y + x  1 (i)
C1(R)  y (ii)
C1(R) + (1  )C2(R)  y +Rx (iii)
The solution to the above problem (y; x) will determine the consumption
levels of early and late consumers. In particular, the bank will promise c to
early consumers such that:
C1 = c =
y

(1)
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Late consumers will receive:
C2 =
Rx
1   (2)
In the benchmark model aggregate uncertainty only concerns the return on
the risky asset and is accurately revealed at t = 1; there, runs only happen
on a truly insolvent banks 4 (i. e. when R is low enough so that C2 < c).
However, as we will show in the section 4, our stochastic structure of p and Rh
yields to di¤erent implications for the run decisions of consumers, as it causes
uncertainty on the size of C2 (i. e. (2) is not accurately observed).
2.1.3 Speculators and Asset Market
There exists an asset market in which the bank can liquidate the risky asset
in the intermediate period t = 1 whenever the withdraw of early consumers
exceeds y: In this market there are some identical speculators that will want
to purchase the risky asset whenever speculative prots can be made, i.e. when
its price falls below its fundamental value. Speculators hold some of the safe
asset, ys, which will be exchanged for the risky asset at a re-sale price. This
price will be determined by the size of ys: the market price (cash-in-market
pricing) will be:
Px =
ys
x
(3)
Throughout the paper we will only consider the case in which ys < y; this
assumption allows us to rule out many cases that are not of interest given the
aim of our paper. It is, however, reasonable to think that the portfolio of the
bank is by far larger than that of speculators, so that can invest in a larger
portion of the safe asset.
4 Throughout the paper, we refer to insolvent bank as a bank which is not able to
guarantee at least c to all consumers.
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2.1.3.1 Information set of Speculators. We assume that speculators
have the same information set of banks and consumers. However, the size of
ys is speculators private information in t = 1: it is revealed only if cash in
market pricing takes place after than a run has occurred.
2.2 Timing, Signal and Runs on a Solvent Bank
2.2.1 Timing and Signal
In the previous section we have outlined the uncertainty regarding pi and Rh
faced by all agents in the model in both t = 0 and t = 1: The main implication
of the above framework is that late consumers can only observe the expected
value of their level of consumption in the nal period, i.e. C2: That is:
E[C2] =
E[R]x
1   =
Rhx
1  (p
h + (1  )pl) (4)
However, we assume that in t = 1 the nature reveals a true and accurate signal
on the expected value of the risky asset. That is,
 = E[R] = pRh (5)
The main implication of the above opaque signal is that depositors cannot
assess with certainty how much of the observed  is due to default risk and
asset return.
Denition An accurate signal on the assets expected return is opaque
because it does not enable agents to disentangle default risk and assets return.
The uncertainty regarding pi and Rh is solved in t = 3
2
while the uncertainty
regarding whether R is Rh or zero is solved in the last period, t = 2. Therefore,
the expected consumption of late consumers becomes:
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E[C2] =
x
1   (6)
Late consumers, given  = 1 , will run only if the following condition holds:
E[C2] < c (7)
that is, if:
 <
y
x
(8)
Since  > 1 then it must also be that a run can only occur when y > x:
Clearly, values of  su¢ ciently low can imply very opposite outcomes: very
high returns associated with very high default risk or very low returns and
low default risk.
If condition (8) holds, then, the run will cause costly liquidation on the asset
market. As stated in the previous section, when consumers decide to run they
do not know the exact size of ys and so what the market price will be in case
of liquidation. While formal asset pricing is derived in the following section,
we summarize the timing of the framework in gure 1.
Figure 1: Timing of the model
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2.2.2 Runs on a Solvent Bank
The problem of runs dictated by the expected values of future consumptions
is mainly that there can be equilibriums in which a run has occurred on what
turns out to be a solvent bank. In particular, for a given portfolio choice of
the bank, (y; x), ine¢ cient runs in these terms will depend on the sizes of
~Rh. For each observed signal  (i.e. ex-post), ~Rhcan be either Rhl or Rhh, such
that  = phRhl with probability  and  = plRhh with probability 1  .
Lets assume that  < y

x so that a run occurs. The bank recur to the asset
market for costly liquidation, as we will model in detail in section 3. When
default risk is low ( = 1) 5 and the good state of the world unveils in t = 2
(pi = ph = 1) the bank is solvent if:
Rhl >
y
x
(9)
Or, if:
 <
y
x
< Rhl (10)
Proposition 1 In the presence of an opaque signal such that   ! 1 and
 < y

x , there might be in equilibrium a run on a potentially solvent bank if
the good state of the world materializes with low default risk. This will occur
whenever Rhl > y

x :
However, the opposite does not hold true: if a bank is insolvent, a run will
never occur with an opaque signal. This is because  > y

x and R
hl < y

x (such
that Rhl < y

x < ) can never occur jointly given that  < R
hl.
5 We are implicitly assuming that Rhhx > y:
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3 Risky Asset Market Pricing
3.1 Risk-Neutral Speculators
In this section we consider the pricing of the risky asset in the market when
identical speculators are risk-neutral. If at date 1 the bank receives an higher
level of withdraws than its available liquidity promised to early consumers,
then, it is obliged by its contract terms to liquidate x and distribute all its
assets on a pro-rate basis to all consumers.
The speculators in this market will observe the signal  before carrying out any
purchase of the risky asset. In particular, the signal  = E[R] will perfectly
reect the fundamental value of the asset, given the risk neutrality of specu-
lators. Indeed, the risk-neutrality of these agents implies that their spending
decisions are not a¤ected by the default risk or the relative return implied in
the signal. Speculators, then, once observed  will purchase the risky asset if
its market price, Px, is below its fundamental value, i.e.  6 .
The pricing in the market happens through a cash-in-market mechanism (Allen
and Gale 1998). That is, since speculators will want to exchange all their safe
asset for the risky, given  > 1, then the price of the risky asset will simply
be the ratio of the safe asset of the speculators, ys, to the risky asset of the
bank, x. In other words, it is the amount of safe asset, readily exchangeable
to cash, to determine the market price of the risky asset. However, speculators
will only buy if speculative prots can be made, that is, if ys in their hands is
such that prices are below fundamentals, that is:
Px =
ys
x
 E(R) =  (11)
Given that (8) must hold, in order to a run to ever occur, then it must be that
speculators will purchase the risky asset whenever the observed signal satises
the following condition:
6 The safe asset is held by speculators in order to exchange it with protable pur-
chases of the risky asset.
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ys
x
   y

x
(12)
The associated consumption levels will be:
C1 = C2 =
y + ys
2
(13)
Figures 2 and 3 depict the asset market pricing of the risky asset and the
(expected and actual) late consumption levels for all signal levels signal re-
spectively.
In gure 2 it can be seen that for  < ys
x there does not exist a market for the
risky asset, thus, its market price is zero as speculators are not willing to buy
the risky asset. In this case, as shown in gure 3, early and late consumers
share equally the available safe asset in the banks portfolio, i.e. y. It is clearly
seen from the pictures that when (12) is satised, then the late (realized)
consumption level is as specied in (13). For high enough signals, i.e.  > y

x ,
then no run occurs and expected late consumption, as perceived in t=1, is
equal to E[C2] = x.
3.2 Risk-Averse Speculators
In this section we relax the assumption of risk-neutrality of speculators, by
assuming that they are risk-averse. The main implication of this modied
setting is that the observed signal  does not reveal anymore the fundamental
value of the risky asset. Therefore, speculators now face uncertainty regarding
the intrinsic value of the asset. Indeed, now the fundamental value has to reect
the default premia that speculators require to take on more risk. At date 1,
if the risky asset has a higher default risk, i.e. pi = pl; then its fundamental
value will be lower than the fundamental value of the asset with the lower
default risk, i.e. pi = pl. The fundamental values of the asset in each state of
the world can be written as:
F hv =
E(R)
1 + l
(14)
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F lv =
E(R)
1 + h
(15)
where l and h are the discounts which reect the default premia of the asset
in each state with h > l: Given F hv > F
l
v, F
h
v is the fundamental value of
the asset for which  = phRhl is true; while F lv is the fundamental value of the
asset for which  = plRhh is true.
Speculators, will buy the risky asset only if (8) occurs and if the two conditions
below are satised:
E(Fv) = F
h
v + (1  )F lv > 1 (16)
Px =
ys
x
< E(Fv) (17)
Condition (16) implies that the expected fundamental value corresponding to
the observed  has a gross return higher than that of the safe asset. (17),
instead, states that the liquidity (safe asset, ys) in the hands of speculators
has to be such that the market price of the risky asset is less than the expected
fundamental value. Indeed, buying only if ys
x
< F lv, would prevent speculators
to make potential speculative prots if F lv <
ys
x
< E(Fv). Solving (17) with
respect to , we nd that:

ys
x
<  (18)
Where:
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 =
1
 
=
1

1+l
+ (1 )
1+h
> 1 (19)
Combining (8) with (18), we nd that the buy-condition for risk-averse spec-
ulators is:

ys
x
<   y

x
(20)
Or:
y0s
x
<   y

x
(21)
with ys = y0s.
The market price of the risky asset, if speculators buy, is always ys
x
:However,
now, contrarily to what seen in the previous section, there is the chance that
speculators might not make speculative prots. Figures 4 and 5 show how this
might occur.
Lets consider the case in which speculators purchase the risky asset as condi-
tion (21) holds for an observed . In gure 4 speculators hold a larger amount
of ys; at a market price Px =
ys
x
speculative prots will be made only if uncer-
tainty unveils in t = 3
2
that  = phRhl so that Fv = F hv . If in t =
3
2
, indeed,
turns out that  = plRhh, then the asset has been overpriced by the cash-
in-market mechanism, i.e. speculators have paid too much for the risky asset.
If, instead, ys is lower, as depicted in gure 5; then speculative prots can be
made even if uncertainty unveils in t = 3
2
that  = plRhh (i.e. Fv = F lv) given
that the signal is at least s. If, instead, the signal is such that y
0
s
x <   s then
again speculators have paid too much for the risky asset. It is worth noting
that a buying strategy for speculators which implies buying if s <   y
x is
not desirable since it would preclude speculators to make considerable prots
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if Fv = F hv .
A last case should also be considered here; that is, the possibility that the
safe asset in the hands of speculators could be so low that they would make
speculative prots whatever the signal. In this case the market prices would
much smaller than the so-far considered cases and speculators will price the
risky asset at a price lower than F lv for all signal included in
y0s
x <   y

x :
If there is no central bankers intervention, late consumers will be better o¤the
higher ys in the speculatorsportfolio, given that it is proportional to market
price paid for the asset.
We can formalize these results as follows:
Proposition 2 With risk-averse speculators an opaque signal causes uncer-
tainty on the fundamental value of the risky asset. When speculators hold
enough safe asset they may overprice the risky asset if the nature unveils a
state of the world with high default risk. In this instance, late consumers are
better o¤ than if the safe asset in the hands of speculators was lower. There-
fore, consumers benet at the speculators expenses from speculators higher
amounts of safe asset holdings with higher default risk.
4 Central Bankers Intervention
In this section we consider the welfare e¤ects of an intervention by the central
banker. The central bank cannot restore consumption levels of a no-run equi-
librium but can guarantee higher levels of late and early consumption than if
cash-in-market pricing had taken place.
The central banker in this model has the same information set of consumers.
That is, he observes the signal  at t = 1. Depending on the market price of the
risky asset, whenever, a bank run occurs, the central banker might decide to
intervene in order to sustain asset prices. If intervenes, he enters a repurchase
agreement with the bank in which he purchase the risky asset. The price
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paid for the risky asset in the repo agreement is equal to its fundamental if
investors are risk-neutral. If, instead, investors are risk-averse then the central
bank faces uncertainty on the fundamental value of the risky asset and might
over/under price the asset. The terms of the repurchase agreement oblige the
bank to re-pay the central banker in t = 2 whatever it gets from the risky
asset. The central banker will enter the repo agreement only if its expected
net gain is greater than zero:
E[NGcb] = x  M [(1  ph) + (1  )(1  pl)] > 0 (22)
Where M = P sx is the price paid by the central banker to the bank for the
purchase of the risky asset at the support price P s.
4.1 Risk-Neutral Speculators
If the asset market is populated by risk-neutral investors, then the fundamental
price of the asset is equal to the observed signal : The central banker might
decide to enter the repo agreement when the liquidity (safe asset) in the hands
of speculators is low enough to drive market prices below fundamentals and
when there is no market for the risky asset. Therefore, he will lend M = x
to the bank with P s = , i.e. he will sustain prices to fundamentals. It can
be easily noticed that in this setting the central bank will enter the repo
agreement at every level of . Indeed, (22) becomes:
E[NGcb] = xf1  [(1  ph) + (1  )(1  pl)]g > 0 8 (23)
The resulting consumption levels for early and late consumers will therefore,
be:
C1 = C2 =
y + x
2
(24)
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This is greater that what consumers would have received if re-sale had oc-
curred:
y + x
2
>
y + Pxx
2
(25)
The main implication of the above intervention is that the central banker that
engages in the rescue intervention is not certain about the solvency of the
bank. Insolvency can be due to either the occurrence of the bad state of the
world, i.e. Rl = 0, or to the fact that in the good state of the world late
consumers get less than early consumers (this will depend on the size of Rhl).
The inability to distinguish a solvent from an insolvent bank renders the inter-
vention by the central bank risky, in the sense that the central bank could bear
the loss if either the bad state of the world materializes or Rhl is low enough
so that the realized (i.e. in t = 2) NGcb is less than zero. In the former case,
then the bank in t = 2 will be unable to pay anything to the central banker,
which will bear a loss equal to, the whole M . If instead, the good state of the
world materializes and Rhl < y

x , then the loss faced by the central banker will
be:
NGcb = (Rhlx) M < 0 (26)
The intervention by the central banker, moreover, avoids late consumers to
bear the losses incurred in the bad state of the world with Rl = 0: In fact, it
guarantees a xed level of consumption for late/early consumer equal to y
+x
2
which is in any case higher than what they would have received if the bank
had gone to the asset market. This is shown in gure 7 in which are depicted
the consumption levels (actual and expected) by late consumers following the
central bankers intervention when  < y

x (blue line). Figure 6, instead, shows
the e¤ect on the pricing of the risky asset of an intervention of this kind (blue
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line): the price is equal to its fundamental for every level of the signal.
Proposition 3 With risk-neutral speculators the central bank will intervene
to support prices to fundamentals at every  < y

x . The central bank will carry
both the default risk and the risk that the bad state of the world materializes.
Consumers are guaranteed a sure and xed consumption level equal to y
+x
2
.
4.2 Risk-Averse Speculators
If the fundamental value of the risky asset is uncertain, then, it becomes more
problematic for the central bank to pursue an intervention aimed to support
fundamental prices. Reasonably, the central bankers intervention when there
is opacity in fundamental values will be such that (1) consumers get more than
they would do from the cash-in-market pricing and (2) the expected net gain
of the central banker are maximized. The risky asset price that the central
bank will support is, thus, dependent on these two conditions. However, it
will on a rst place depend on the cash-in-market price in the assets market
which is determined by ys. Indeed, a ts-for-all policy that sustain prices at
the expected fundamental level (i.e. P s = E(Fv) for 8  < yx ) could decrease
the expected net gains of the central bank. Lets see this in more details.
Lets assume, for simplicity, that the central bank has three possible interven-
tion strategies. That is, it can lend to the bank either M1, M2 or M3:
M1 = E(Fv)x
 (27)
M2 = F
h
v x
 (28)
M3 = F
l
vx
 (29)
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The corresponding expected net gains are:
E[NGcb1 ] = x
(  E(Fv))[(1  ph) + (1  )(1  pl)]g (30)
E[NGcb2 ] = x
(  F hv )[(1  ph) + (1  )(1  pl)]g (31)
E[NGcb3 ] = x
(  F lv)[(1  ph) + (1  )(1  pl)]g (32)
Given that  > E(Fv),  > F iv and that 0  (1   ph) + (1   )(1  pl)  1
then it must be that:
E[NGcb3 ] < E[NG
cb
1 ] < E[NG
cb
2 ] (33)
Also note that (30), (31) and (32) are all greater than zero 8, therefore the
central banker always wishes to intervene and lend to the bank.
4.2.1 Intervention with high levels of ys
If speculators hold abundant levels of ys in their portfolio, as described in
gure 4, as we have already seen, they will make speculative prots only if he
fundamental value turns out to be high (low default risk) when y
0
s
x <   y

x .
Sustaining asset price to low fundamental values, i.e. P s = F lv andM3 = F
l
vx
,
although maximizes the expected net gain of the central banker, would not
be a sustainable intervention. This is because early and late consumers would
get less than if speculators were purchasing the asset, that is:
y + ys
2
>
y + F lvx

2
(34)
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Therefore, when y
0
s
x <   y

x the central bank will support prices to its ex-
pected fundamental values since E[NGcb3 ] < E[NG
cb
1 ]. The actual consumption
level are, thus:
C1 = C2 =
y + E[Fv]x
2
(35)
However, when the signal is low enough so that no market for the risky asset
exists, that is, when  < y
0
s
x , then the central banker can support prices to low
fundamental values, that is P s = F lv. In this case, early and late consumers
will get more than if they were sharing equally the available y:
C1 = C2 =
y + F lvx

2
>
y
2
(36)
The pricing of the risky asset with central banks intervention and high levels
of ys is depicted in gure 8.
Proposition 4 With risk-averse speculators and high enough market prices
(and ys) the central bank intervenes to support prices at every  <
y
x . The
central bank will carry both the default risk and the risk that the bad state of
the world materializes. Consumers are guaranteed a xed consumption level
equal to y
+Psx
2
.
A central bankers intervention of this kind (i. e. with opacity) can cause
ine¢ cient asset pricing, that is, asset pricing di¤erent from fundamentals.
Indeed, when the signal is very low such as  < y
0
s
x the central bank might
under-price the asset, lending to the bank less than it should have received if
in t = 3
2
it occurs that  = phRhl (so that Fv = F hv ). For higher levels of the
signals such that y
0
s
x <   y

x the central bank is surely either over-pricing
or under-pricing the asset. In other words, the central bank is lending either
more or less than the bank should be entitled to, given the quality of its assets.
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Proposition 5 Opacity leads to ine¢ cient policy responses. The central bank
can lend either more or less than the bank should be entitled to, given the
quality of its assets.
Proposition 6 Given high values of the signal (but always less than y

x ), risk-
averse speculators and high enough market prices (i.e. high ys), the policy
response is surely ine¢ cient.
4.2.2 Intervention with low levels of ys
If speculators hold relatively low levels of safe asset as in gure 5, we have
already shown that there exist a boundary signal s which determines two
di¤erent outcomes for speculators. If the signal is such that s <   y
x ,
then, speculative prots can be made whatever the fundamental value unveils
(although clearly F hv is associated with higher prots). If, instead, the signal
is such that y
0
s
x <   s then again speculators make prots only if the default
risk attached to the asset is low, that is, if Fv = F hv .
The central banker, thus, will adopt three di¤erent intervention strategies,
depending on the observed signal. If there is no market for the risky asset as
 < y
0
s
x , as before, the central banker will support prices to F
l
v, lending to the
bank M3 and achieving the consumption levels as in (37). If the signal is such
that y
0
s
x <   s then, for the same reasoning as in the previous section, the
central banker lends M1 to the bank. If, instead, s <   yx then the central
bank will maximize its expected net gain by lending M3 to the bank, which
implies P s = F lv with the following consumption levels:
C1 = C2 =
y + F lvx

2
>
y + ys
2
(37)
The pricing of the risky asset with central banks intervention and low levels
of ys is depicted in gure 9:
The safe asset in the hands of speculators, however, could be so low that they
would make speculative prots whatever the signal (in this case the signal
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s would not exist). In this case, clearly the central bank would support the
prices of the asset at its low fundamental value.
From these results we can formalize the following proposition:
Proposition 7 When speculators hold low levels of safe asset, so that market
prices are relatively lower, the central bank tends to support asset prices as
if they carried a high default risk. For a small interval of signals, however,
the central bank might over-price/under-price the asset.if the cash-in-market
mechanism yields a higher pricing than F lv.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we have included opacity in a simple model in which a repre-
sentative bank, solving an optimal risk-sharing problem, is subject to runs by
depositors. Opacity is modeled through the inclusion of unobservable default
risk on the banks portfolio, as well as unobservable return on the risky asset.
The unability of the agents to distinguish between the two, given a signal sent
by the nature on their product, has many interesting implications. Firstly,
we show that run decisions based on expected consumption levels can cause
a run on a solvent bank. Secondly, we model the asset market pricing that
occurs through a cash-in-market mechanism. In this regard, we stress that
opacity leads to uncertainty on the fundamental value of the risky asset when
speculators in the asset market are risk-averse. Lastly, we analyze the welfare
implications of a central bankers intervention which is unable to prevent the
run but ensures a xed level of consumption higher than if speculators were
purchasing the asset during a run. The central banker, with the aim to min-
imize its loss function, will be very likely to enter a repo agreement with the
bank by o¤ering a price for the risky asset equal to the lowest fundamental
level that it can take. Therefore, opacity can cause ine¢ cient policy responses:
this is because the central bank lends either more or less than the bank should
be entitled to, given the quality of its assets.
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Figures
Figure 2: Risky asset pricing and observed signal with risk-neutral
speculators (without central bankers intervention)
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Figure 3: Expected late consumption and observed signal with risk-
neutral speculators (without central bankers intervention). A bank
run associated with speculators purchase of the risky asset occurs if the observed
signal at date 1 is such that ys
x    y

x . Realized late consumption in this case is
equal to C2 =
y+ys
2
. It is easily seen that at this consumption level, late consumers
receive more than they would have got if they did not run if ys
x    s = y
+ys
2x .
Otherwise (i.e. if s    y
x ) late consumers would have received more if they did
not run and cash-in-market pricing did not take place, even if E[C2] < y. Indeed,
recall that when a run takes place, consumers are unaware of the size of ys. When
the signal is so low that speculators are not willing to buy, i.e.   ys
x , the bank
will share equally among early and late consumers the available y. Also in this
case, late consumers might have received more if they did not run, in particular as
! ys
x .
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Figure 4: Buying decision and observed signal with risk-averse speculators-
high levels of ys: Note that y0sx = 
ys
x :
Figure 5: Buying decision and observed signal with risk-averse speculators-
low levels of ys
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Figure 6: Risky asset pricing and observed signal with risk-neutral
speculators (with central bankers intervention)
Figure 7: Expected late consumption and observed signal with risk-
neutral speculators (with central bankers intervention)
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Figure 8: Risky asset pricing and observed signal with risk-averse
speculators (with central bankers intervention)- high levels of ys.
The red lines refer to asset market pricing without intervention. That is, when
 < y
0
s
x there is no market for the risky asset; when
y0s
x <   y

x there is cash-
in-market asset pricing. In the former case, the central bank will support prices to
low fundamentals (blue line). In the latter case, it will support prices to expected
fundamental values (blue line).
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Figure 9: Risky asset pricing and observed signal with risk-averse
speculators (with central bankers intervention)- low levels of ys:
The red lines refer to asset market pricing without intervention. That is, when
 < y
0
s
x there is no market for the risky asset; when
y0s
x <   y

x there is cash-in-
market asset pricing. In the former case, the central bank will support prices to low
fundamentals (blue line). When y
0
s
x <   s the central banker support prices at
expected fundamental values (blue line). When s <   y
x the central bank will
support prices to low fundamentals (blue line).
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